EFFECTS OF THE KOREAN WAR
Relationships between the two superpowers
In many ways, the Korean War set the tone for Cold War conflicts, especially in Asia. Despite flirting with 'rollback' when allowing MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel in 1950 (an example of ill-fated
Ad Hoc
policy making), Truman's policy of containment was confirmed as the official US Cold War doctrine. Despite arguably being a flawed doctrine (it committed the US to essentially fighting defensive wars regardless of the strategic or economic importance of the 'interests' they were protecting), it nevertheless ensure limited wars without the use of nuclear weapons. Equally, the USSR had shown that it also was not prepared to engage the US directly in a land war. This is especially significant on the heels of the Berlin Blockade- both sides had now avoided confrontation in Europe and Asia. However, like the Berlin Blockade, it did reaffirm the strategy that both sides attempted at various points during the first half of the Cold War- how to get as close as possible to threatening war without actually engaging the enemy. This approach would ultimately manifest itself in the nuclear policy of Brinkmanship.
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For Eisenhower, the negotiated end to the Korean War was a personal triumph (as evidenced by the 1956 election campaign TV commercial to the right) and allowed for a change in direction in Cold War policy. Eisenhower embarked on a 'new look' that reduced overall military spending and drastically decreased the role of manpower. His administration focussed on building up a stockpile of nuclear weapons instead and engaged in a series of CIA covert operations in countries such as Iran and Guatemala.
By 1955, Nikita Khrushchev had emerged as the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union and while relations between the two superpowers remained tense for the rest of the 1950's and early '1960's, he too observed many of the unofficial boundaries jotted out by Truman and Stalin during the early Cold War period. |
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North and South Korea
Korea remained divided at the 38th Parallel and while Korean nationalism had been a driving force in causing this conflict, ironically both the DPRK and ROK were reliant on (and largely at the mercy of) the two superpowers. Despite both Kim and Rhee attempting to use Korean nationalism to unite the Korean peninsula and impose their vision of government upon the other, they could not ultimately extricate themselves from a position where both needed the support of their sponsoring superpower. Both sides had suffered tremendous damage and loss of life during the war and spent much of the 1950's rebuilding. The DPRK's economy began growing at a faster rate earlier than the ROK- by 1957, industrial production was back to pre-1949 levels. Kim Il-Sung, a Stalinist, opposed and denounced Khrushchev's policy of De-Stalinization and aligned itself with China in condemning the 'revisionism' of Khrushchev's USSR.
However, unlike China, it maintained ties with the USSR. Following Chinese normalization of relations with the West in the 1970's (along with the death of Mao), the PRC began
re-evaluating its relations with the DPRK and Kim began to sever ties in response. This would prove to be tremendously costly as by the late 1980's North Korea entered a period of economic decline from which it has yet to emerge. This decline was exacerbated by the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and wide spread flooding in the mid-1990s. Kim's successor, his son Kim Jong-il, re-established ties with China but was also forced to accepted UN food aid.
In contrast, the South took longer to emerge from post-war economic difficulties. Rhee was beset by corruption scandals which culminated in student protests and a constitutional crisis in 1960. Rhee was removed from power in a coup d'etat led by General Park Chung-Hee and, bolstered by substantial US aid, 1962 saw the beginning of a period of unprecedented economic growth ('The Miracle on the Han River') fuelled by exports. Despite leading this economic growth, Park also continued the political repression of his predecessor and ruled until his assassination in 1979. His death, along with the despotic excesses of his successor (Chun doo-Hwan), ultimately led to installation of democracy in South Korea by the late 1980's. Since 2000, South Korea has tried to engage diplomatically with North Korea as part of its 'Sunshine Policy'.
In contrast, the South took longer to emerge from post-war economic difficulties. Rhee was beset by corruption scandals which culminated in student protests and a constitutional crisis in 1960. Rhee was removed from power in a coup d'etat led by General Park Chung-Hee and, bolstered by substantial US aid, 1962 saw the beginning of a period of unprecedented economic growth ('The Miracle on the Han River') fuelled by exports. Despite leading this economic growth, Park also continued the political repression of his predecessor and ruled until his assassination in 1979. His death, along with the despotic excesses of his successor (Chun doo-Hwan), ultimately led to installation of democracy in South Korea by the late 1980's. Since 2000, South Korea has tried to engage diplomatically with North Korea as part of its 'Sunshine Policy'.
China
The Korean War was a huge boost to the fledgling PRC. Mao's government had shown that they could successfully defend their revolution from would-be external enemies and held their own against technologically superior US forces. However, the war was very significant with regard to causing the Sino-Soviet split. Although Mao had huge respect for Stalin, he was resentful of the way in which he was excluded from discussions between Mao and Kim in 1949 and 1950. He was insulted to be informed second-hand by Kim that the PRC was expected to intervene in the event of a deteriorating situation for DPRK forces and was anxious not to be treated as a client-state of the USSR. In fact this last point, was picked up George Kennan (The US State Department's 'Mr. X' and author of the Long Telegram) who argued that China had aligned itself with the Soviet Union only for short-term geopolitical purposes. Following the death of Stalin, the rise to power of Khrushchev and his subsequent 'secret speech' (where he denounced Stalin), China continued to move further away from the USSR. Following the disaster of the 'Great Leap Forward' by 1960, a Sino-Soviet Split had clearly emerged.
The road to Vietnam
Finally, from a Cold War perspective, the most significant legacy of the Korean War was to set the USA on a path to war in Vietnam. The end of the war in Korea appeared to stabilize the geopolitical situation in the Far East and be held up as a successful example of containment. In 1954, the superpowers began to focus on Southeast Asia when the Vietminh defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu. At the subsequent peace conference in Geneva, the Eisenhower administration first began to publicly and openly talk about domino theory in regard to Vietnam. The idea of falling dominoes in Asia had been discussed behind closed doors prior to this and it was clear that the US experience in Korea played a significant role in the formulation of this theory. The spectre of Chinese involvement in Korea was also a significant factor in US military strategy during the war in Vietnam; namely their fear of advancing north of the 17th Parallel.
