COURSE AND PRACTICES OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM
The decision of Johnson to seek congressional approval to escalate the 'conflict' in Vietnam came at a time of heightened Cold War fervor in the USA. The Berlin Wall and Cuban Missile Crisis had both occurred recently and with a presidential election on the horizon, Johnson could ill-afford to appear weak when confronting the 'Communist Menace'. However, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was a curse as much as a blessing. While he had in effect been given a 'blank check' in Vietnam, failure to win the war would be hard to excuse given that he now had the benefits of full US military might.
US strategy during the war can broadly be described in two ways:
US strategy during the war can broadly be described in two ways:
- During the 1964-1968 period, the height of the war, the US followed a strategy of escalation, with massive troop increases and substantial bombing campaigns of the North.
- During the 1969-75 period, the US followed a strategy of 'Vietnamization', which aimed to train up South Vietnamese troops to eventually replace US troops, supported by US air power.
1965: The year of escalation
In March 1965, a US Marine barracks at Pleiku (just south of the 17th Parallel) was attacked by the NLF, leaving 8 US servicemen dead. Johnson, backed by huge public support, dispatched 3,500 US Marines to South Vietnam, who landed near Da Nang a week later. This deployment was bolstered by another 200,000 troops by the December. At the same time, a huge bombing campaign of North Vietnam, code-named Operation "Rolling Thunder" began. The aim of both the troop deployment and the Operation "Rolling Thunder" was to demonstrate American military might to the North Vietnamese and the NLF with the expectation that they would back down or negotiate a favorable peace settlement for South Vietnam.
The Battle of Ia Drang Valley
However, the Vietnamese communists defied these expectations. Ho Chi Minh warned them that if the Americans
"want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea."
This was attitude was backed up by the communist Vietnamese actions at the Battle of Ia Drang Valley, the first major engagement of the war in November 1965. In actuality, the result was a stalemate with 250 American dead and 1000 communist Vietnamese dead. Of more significance was how the battle set the tone for the rest of the war. The US, under General William Westmoreland, measured success in statistics- he claimed that the number of enemy dead (4:1 ratio) meant that the US had prevailed at Ia Drang. Statistical kill data would be used to demonstrate progress up until 1968. American forces had also displayed their tactical prowess in their use of helicopters to maneuver troops around the battle field to target enemy weak spots and their use of overwhelming air power.
However, the Vietnamese claimed a moral victory, which in time would be more significant. One US journalist present at Ia Drang, Joseph L. Galloway, commented that Ia Drang was "the battle that convinced Ho Chi Minh he could win" . Despite sustaining far heavier casualties, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) units had overcome superior technology and firepower to secure a draw. Moreover, by learning that they could negate superior weaponry by engaging the Americans in close combat, they had discovered a vital tactical blueprint for how they should fight the remainder of the war.
This was attitude was backed up by the communist Vietnamese actions at the Battle of Ia Drang Valley, the first major engagement of the war in November 1965. In actuality, the result was a stalemate with 250 American dead and 1000 communist Vietnamese dead. Of more significance was how the battle set the tone for the rest of the war. The US, under General William Westmoreland, measured success in statistics- he claimed that the number of enemy dead (4:1 ratio) meant that the US had prevailed at Ia Drang. Statistical kill data would be used to demonstrate progress up until 1968. American forces had also displayed their tactical prowess in their use of helicopters to maneuver troops around the battle field to target enemy weak spots and their use of overwhelming air power.
However, the Vietnamese claimed a moral victory, which in time would be more significant. One US journalist present at Ia Drang, Joseph L. Galloway, commented that Ia Drang was "the battle that convinced Ho Chi Minh he could win" . Despite sustaining far heavier casualties, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) units had overcome superior technology and firepower to secure a draw. Moreover, by learning that they could negate superior weaponry by engaging the Americans in close combat, they had discovered a vital tactical blueprint for how they should fight the remainder of the war.
Communist Tactics- Guerrilla warfare
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Understanding that they faced a technologically superior enemy, the communists adopted guerrilla tactics that were designed to negate US forces' advanced weaponry. The VC built astonishingly elaborate underground tunnel complexes where their soldiers could shelter during Napalm or bombing raids and from which to launch ambushes on American patrols. The majority of these ambushes would take place at night, were designed to cause fear in American soldiers and caused US forces to give up land that they had seized during the day. An assortment of booby traps were also used in jungle areas. A supply route from North Vietnam was also opened up, running through Laos and Cambodia, known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail (see map on the right).
A huge advantage the VC was their knowledge of local language, customs and terrain. They were able to live off the land (thereby eliminating the need for a formal headquarters or base of operations) and assimilate themselves easily into villages. Another significant problem for US forces that the VC were not dressed like regular conventional soldiers. They dressed like peasants and could be women and children as well as men. When young American soldiers (the average age of US personnel in Vietnam was 19) entered villages with potential VC hiding there, breakdowns of discipline did occur, such as the infamous incident at My Lai, partly because it was so difficult to distinguish between friend and foe. Although it must be remembered that the VC were not by any means universally popular in the Vietnamese countryside (their methods of control and indoctrination could be particularly brutal), they were assisted in their battle to win over peasants' hearts and minds by US tactics (see below), which were heavy handed and not considerate of local culture of customs. Their presence in cities such as Saigon, Nha Trang and Da Nang was limited to bombings, mostly because inhabitants in these cities were predisposed to capitalism and understood that the large American presence in South Vietnam was good for business. |
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US tactics- 'Search and Destroy' and Strategic Hamlets Program
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The most significant communist threat to South Vietnam between 1965 and the end of 1967 came from the Vietcong in rural areas. To prevent communist infiltration of villages, a Strategic Hamlets Program was established. Villages and hamlets deemed most vulnerable to communist takeover were ordered to be abandoned, often burned down with food stuffs destroyed and the inhabitants moved to alternate villages within a secure perimeter.
In order to demonstrate progress in the war, it was decided to accumulate the greatest amount of enemy deaths. This was based on the flawed assumption that there was a finite number of communists in South Vietnam. Therefore, 'Search and Destroy' tactics were created, with the aim of taking advantage of American troop mobility (with the help of helicopters) and superior weapons technology. |
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In order to counter the problem of locating an enemy hiding in the jungle regions of Vietnam, napalm and agent orange were used. Both weapons did tremendous damage to the Vietnamese countryside, on which the peasant farming culture relied. The use of a chemical defoliant such as agent orange also was responsible for causing cancers in children and adults and birth defects in unborn fetuses.
1968 Tet offensive
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In January 1968, during the Tet holiday (Vietnamese lunar new year), NVA and VC units launched a massive offensive into South Vietnam. This occurred during the biggest Vietnamese holiday when there was traditionally a cease-fire. By launching surprise attack, the communists hoped that the people of South Vietnam would join them in overthrowing the South Vietnamese government and defeat the Americans. ARVN and US military units temporarily lost control of cities such as the old imperial capital of Hue and fighting hit the streets of Saigon, with suicide bombers even able to run into the US Embassy.
After several weeks, the US were able to regain control of South Vietnam and push the NVA back north of the 17th Parallel. Militarily the Tet Offensive was a clear defeat for communist forces- they sustain twice the number of casualties as South Vietnamese, American, South Korean, Thai, Australian and New Zealand forces combined and the VC were almost wiped out in the process. From this point on, the NVA did the bulk of the fighting in Vietnam. |
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However, and crucially, Tet represented a decisive psychological knock out for the United States. The use of enemy kill statistics to demonstrate progress in the war had been completely undermined, along with any notions that the US were winning the war. It convinced many Americans who were watching the war on the nightly news in their living rooms that the end of the war was not in sight and may have in fact have been unwinnable. The timing of the Tet Offensive was also significant. With a US presidential election approaching, the war was becoming increasingly unpopular with American voters. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who had supported the policy of escalation in 1964 and 1965 but had since become disillusioned with the war, resigned in February 1968. One month later, Johnson announced to a shocked nation that he not seek the Democratic Party nomination for the presidential election. Suddenly, the will of the American public to continue fighting a long and costly war had been sapped.
The end of escalation and the beginning of 'Vietnamization'
As well as Tet representing a "psychological knockout", it exposed the futility of Westmoreland's 'Search and Destroy' tactics and use of enemy kill statistics. Following Richard Nixon's election as president, the US followed a policy of "Vietnamization". This policy represented a shift from American forces doing the bulk of the fighting to training up the ARVN troops to eventually replace them. This process would continue to be supported by American bombing campaigns of North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, even in parts of Cambodia as occurred in 1970..
The impact of the war in America
By 1968, the anti-war movement was a strong force in American politics. Opposition to the war came from civil rights activists who were concerned about the disproportionately large numbers of African-Americans fighting in Vietnam, university students who opposed the draft and many returning veterans who had experienced the conflict first-hand. Many of the anti-war protesters were also influenced by televised news reports on the war and protests at home. As with much of the 1960's, the advent of TV was hugely significant. Their reasons for opposing the war were:
- The physical cost of the war (in terms of the destruction of Vietnam and lives lost)
- The financial cost of the war (the US were spending $20 billion per annum on the war)
- The moral cost of the war
- The Tet Offensive
- The impact the war was having at home
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Following the expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970, there was an eruption of college campus protests across the nation. On 4th of May, four students (and anti-war protesters) were shot dead by Ohio militia. For many Americans, this was the moment that the war in Vietnam came home. The shootings caused a surge in anti-war protests on college campuses.
In 1971, the Pentagon Papers, a top secret Department of Defense study about American involvement in Vietnam was leaked by Daniel Ellsberg (a US military analyst) to the New York Times. The study was requested by former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and indicated that the Johnson administration had systematically lied to and misled the American public about the true cause and nature of American involvement in Vietnam. More specifically, the Pentagon Papers appeared to state that the war had been fought to contain China rather than assist South Vietnam. |
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The Paris Peace Accords
Promising 'peace with honor', Nixon sought to find a satisfactory end to the USA's involvement in Vietnam. Launching a brutal bombing campaign of Hanoi (the North Vietnamese capital) and Haiphong (an important industrial port in North Vietnam), he managed to coerce the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. The so-called 'Christmas bombing', was part of Nixon's 'mad man' strategy, where he wanted to convey to the North that he was prepared to do anything in order to accomplish the goals of the United States. This bombing campaign was condemned by many in the international community, including Western allies of the United States.
In January 1973, the USA, the Vietcong, South Vietnam and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accords which reaffirmed the agreements made at Geneva in 1954; Vietnam would remain divided at the 17th Parallel. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong agreed to remove their forces from areas of South Vietnamese control while the Americans (and other foreign powers) would withdraw their forces by April 1975. Under the terms of the accords, the USA were permitted to resupply South Vietnamese forces military on a one-for-one basis. Crucially there was no provision within the accords to allow American re-intervention on behalf of the South if the North violated the agreement. To compensate for this, Nixon promised President Thieu (of South Vietnam) that he would order an intense bombing of the North if this did occur but this was very much a private agreement between two leaders rather than an official agreement between all the signatories.
The accords were unpopular with both North and South Vietnam would routinely violated them afterwards. The North saw the accords as yet more evidence of American interference and perceived them as illegitimate- North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho refused to accept his Nobel Peace Prize for his part in the negotiations (his American counterpart, Henry Kissinger, did accept his). The South were also unhappy with the accords as they saw the provisions unsustainable in the long-term. Badly needing to accomplish 'peace with honor', the Nixon administration both coerced the South Vietnamese (by threatening to withdraw altogether and end support) and made promises (Nixon's pledge to support the South with air strikes) to encourage them to sign the accords. As Nixon had just won the 1972 Presidential Election by a landslide, Thieu had no reason not to believe that Nixon could not deliver on his promise.
Ultimately, the party that benefited most from the Paris Peace Accords was the United States, particularly the Nixon administration. At the time, it appeared that Nixon want secured 'peace with honor' and achieved an American withdrawal from a deeply unpopular war. However, it was not until two years later that the flaws in accords emerged.
In January 1973, the USA, the Vietcong, South Vietnam and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Accords which reaffirmed the agreements made at Geneva in 1954; Vietnam would remain divided at the 17th Parallel. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong agreed to remove their forces from areas of South Vietnamese control while the Americans (and other foreign powers) would withdraw their forces by April 1975. Under the terms of the accords, the USA were permitted to resupply South Vietnamese forces military on a one-for-one basis. Crucially there was no provision within the accords to allow American re-intervention on behalf of the South if the North violated the agreement. To compensate for this, Nixon promised President Thieu (of South Vietnam) that he would order an intense bombing of the North if this did occur but this was very much a private agreement between two leaders rather than an official agreement between all the signatories.
The accords were unpopular with both North and South Vietnam would routinely violated them afterwards. The North saw the accords as yet more evidence of American interference and perceived them as illegitimate- North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho refused to accept his Nobel Peace Prize for his part in the negotiations (his American counterpart, Henry Kissinger, did accept his). The South were also unhappy with the accords as they saw the provisions unsustainable in the long-term. Badly needing to accomplish 'peace with honor', the Nixon administration both coerced the South Vietnamese (by threatening to withdraw altogether and end support) and made promises (Nixon's pledge to support the South with air strikes) to encourage them to sign the accords. As Nixon had just won the 1972 Presidential Election by a landslide, Thieu had no reason not to believe that Nixon could not deliver on his promise.
Ultimately, the party that benefited most from the Paris Peace Accords was the United States, particularly the Nixon administration. At the time, it appeared that Nixon want secured 'peace with honor' and achieved an American withdrawal from a deeply unpopular war. However, it was not until two years later that the flaws in accords emerged.
OPEC oil embargo and Watergate
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Following western (including American) support for Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur (or October) War in the Middle East, OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), led by its Arab members, launched economic sanctions. The extent of these sanctions was a decrease in oil production and and a drastic reduction in exports to the USA. This caused severe oil shortages in the USA and a stock market crash that sent the US into a three-year recession and led to economic stagflation (a stagnant economy and inflation). Consequently, US financial and military support to South Vietnam was put in doubt.
This was compounded a further development, the Watergate crisis, which saw the resignation of Nixon. He was replaced by his Vice-President, Gerald Ford. More significantly, the combined effects of these two crises drained any residual determination on the part of the Democratic-controlled Congress to maintain support for South Vietnam. As a result, the House of Representatives voted to defund the one-for-one replacement provision of the Paris Peace Accords. |
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The Fall of Saigon
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As the final American withdrawal approached, President Ford urged Congress (then controlled by the Democrats) to continue to fund the Saigon regime. Their refusal to do so was the final nail in the coffin of South Vietnam.
On April 30th 1975, the last American servicemen, along with some desperate South Vietnamese refugees left Vietnam. On the same day, the NVA captured Saigon, stormed the Presidential Palace and renamed the city Ho Chi Minh City. Following the unification of Vietnam, thousands of South Vietnamese who did not leave with the Americans were sent to re-education camps. Close to 800,000 left for other countries by boat- the so-called 'boat people". |
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Why did the US fail to win the war in Vietnam?
Ultimately, American public will to continue fighting in Vietnam was drained. As a democracy, the American government had to listen to the electorate. At the core of public dissatisfaction with the war was the belief that the war was unwinnable, an opinion was informed by the Tet Offensive. On top of this, there were significant domestic problems that required attention, especially issues relating to the economy and civil rights. The powerful anti-war movement, which effectively tore the Democratic party apart in 1968 (and significantly weakened it for the next two decades), had emerged because of a range of concerns about the war that came from students, civil rights activists and veterans. The USA's free media were able to openly report on both the war in Vietnam and protests at home, further emboldening the anti-war protesters.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the tactics of the communists in their application of Guerrilla tactics and exploiting the opportunities that came their way in fighting a democracy. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the leader of the NVA, said that "the was was fought on many fronts, the most important [front] was American public opinion."
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the tactics of the communists in their application of Guerrilla tactics and exploiting the opportunities that came their way in fighting a democracy. General Vo Nguyen Giap, the leader of the NVA, said that "the was was fought on many fronts, the most important [front] was American public opinion."