BERLIN 1953-61
East German Riots of 1953
The leader of the GDR (East Germany) in 1953 was Stalinist Walter Ulbricht. He became extremely unpopular with many East Germans in the early 1950's when he introduced his first Five Year Plan, which aimed to double Germany's 1936 industrial output. While this was achieved with regard to iron, steel and chemicals by 1952, Ulbricht was anxious to make further improvements in output. He raised workers' individual production quotas by 10% at the same time there were sharp rises in food and public transportation prices.
Under greater stress, many East Germans fled to West Berlin to escape Ulbricht's regime. To many inside the East German government, it appeared that the GDR was on the path to ruin and catastrophe. Eventually, these concerns would materialise inside the Kremlin. |
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Stalin's death in March 1953 was also significant in increasing tensions inside the GDR as many East Germans believed that the prospect of Soviet intervention in the event of revolt was now far less likely. However, this was exactly what the new Soviet leadership (a triumvirate of Beria, Malenkov and Molotov) was considering if the crisis continue to escalate, with the fear that such a response would make their long-term goal of a unified Communist Germany almost impossible to attain. Moreover, Ulbricht's GDR was becoming an expensive and unstable satellite state to support. Beria and Malenkov both believed that the best option the USSR possessed was to propose a neutral unified Germany to the Western allies and set about persuading other high ranking Communists within the Soviet Union. They argued that, to achieve such an outcome, a unified Germany would be willing to pay the USSR significant reparations.
Senior Communist officials in Moscow were unresponsive to Beria and Malenkov's arguments and continued to work towards a unified Communist Germany. They summoned Ulbricht to Moscow to instruct him to scale down his ambitions of rapid socialization in the GDR and to placate angry workers. However, their words of caution came too late and Ulbricht failed remove the 10% production quota increase. Some of his peers believed this was deliberate on his part in order to incite a revolt that would require Soviet intervention, making it difficult to reunify Germany and therefore maintaining his position of power within the GDR.
Within two weeks of the summit between the leaders of the Kremlin and Ulbricht in Moscow, riots and strikes broke out across East Germany, with much of the unrest taking place in East Berlin. Soviet troops intervened almost immediately, although riots and demonstrations continued throughout much of the summer. These events were hugely significant in terms of defining the GDR's relationship with the USSR. Anxious to exert their authority and give an impression of strength and unity in the aftermath of Stalin's death (when the Soviet leadership was not at all unified on the issue of the future of the GDR), the USSR ultimately backed Ulbricht's leadership and increased its commitment to East Germany. This shifted the power within this relationship somewhat, in favour of the GDR, and caused a surge of nationalist sentiment in West Germany, which was exploited by Konrad Adenauer to win re-election the same year. Although the USA did not want to risk war with the USSR by providing military support to the protesters in the GDR, they made enough symbolic gestures of moral support to ensure that their standing within the FRG was not harmed.
Senior Communist officials in Moscow were unresponsive to Beria and Malenkov's arguments and continued to work towards a unified Communist Germany. They summoned Ulbricht to Moscow to instruct him to scale down his ambitions of rapid socialization in the GDR and to placate angry workers. However, their words of caution came too late and Ulbricht failed remove the 10% production quota increase. Some of his peers believed this was deliberate on his part in order to incite a revolt that would require Soviet intervention, making it difficult to reunify Germany and therefore maintaining his position of power within the GDR.
Within two weeks of the summit between the leaders of the Kremlin and Ulbricht in Moscow, riots and strikes broke out across East Germany, with much of the unrest taking place in East Berlin. Soviet troops intervened almost immediately, although riots and demonstrations continued throughout much of the summer. These events were hugely significant in terms of defining the GDR's relationship with the USSR. Anxious to exert their authority and give an impression of strength and unity in the aftermath of Stalin's death (when the Soviet leadership was not at all unified on the issue of the future of the GDR), the USSR ultimately backed Ulbricht's leadership and increased its commitment to East Germany. This shifted the power within this relationship somewhat, in favour of the GDR, and caused a surge of nationalist sentiment in West Germany, which was exploited by Konrad Adenauer to win re-election the same year. Although the USA did not want to risk war with the USSR by providing military support to the protesters in the GDR, they made enough symbolic gestures of moral support to ensure that their standing within the FRG was not harmed.
The Berlin Wall Crisis 1958-1961
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The Two Berlins
The Soviet response to the East German Riots appeared to confirm the separation of Germany and rule out reunification. For both sides, especially in the aftermath of the events of 1956, any attempts to change the situation would be considered risky. Therefore, it was desirable to maintain the status quo. However, the issue of Berlin remained a thorny issue, or as Khrushchev put it-
"a fishbone in East Germany's gullet"
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Between 1953 and 1961, one sixth of the East German population crossed the open border between East and West Berlin to emigrate to West Germany (encouraged by the FRG authorities)- many of these were skilled workers crucial to the operation of the GDR's economy. At the same time, West Berlin was an outstanding advert for Western capitalist democracy as the standard of living there was considerably higher than in East Berlin. |
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Khrushchev's Ultimatum
Acknowledging the great advances made by the Adenauer government in the FRG (who wanted to reunite Germany), Khrushchev wanted to prevent a unified, capitalist Germany armed with nuclear weapons with American support. Memories of the Nazi occupation of large parts of the USSR were still strong and the Soviet leadership privately feared that a united German could ally with Poland and realign the Polish economy along Capitalist lines, thereby depriving the USSR of a buffer on its western border which was considered hugely significant for its long-term security.
Moreover, conscious that West Berlin was great propaganda for the West- Kennedy would describe it as
"an island of freedom in a sea of Communism"
- as well as an advance intelligence base, Khrushchev sought to resolve this issue. He was also under great pressure from Ulbricht, who was concerned about the migration problem and now had more influence in Moscow following the 1953 riots (see above). In 1958, Khrushchev demanded that the four occupying powers (UK, USA, USSR and France) withdraw from Berlin and allow it to become a "free city". Failure to meet his deadline would result in Khrushchev handing control of routes into and out of West Berlin to the GDR. The ramifications of such an action would mean that the West would have to negotiate directly with the East Germans, forcing them to recognize a state, with an unpredictable leader whom they had tried to ignore for so long.
Although Khrushchev's ultimatum failed to secure his demands, he had succeeded in elevating the Berlin issue to the top of the Cold War agenda. A foreign ministers' summit of the four occupying powers of Berlin was held in 1959 but failed to agree on anything substantial. Khrushchev was also invited to the USA by Eisenhower- a source of great excitement for the Soviet leader- and discussed Berlin with the American president at Camp David. Another summit in Paris was planned for 1960 but was called off at the last minute when an a US U-2 spy plane was shot down over Soviet airspace. Khrushchev decided to wait until 1961 before further meetings with the USA, anxious to see who would win the presidential election to replace Eisenhower. When John F. Kennedy emerged victorious in November 1960, the Soviet leader decided to test the inexperienced newcomer in the White House.
Khrushchev and Kennedy
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In June 1961, Kennedy and Khrushchev met for the first time in Vienna. A range of Cold War issues were discussed- nuclear weapons, Cuba (the summit was only two months after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion) and the developing instability in Laos and Vietnam- however, the future of Berlin emerged at the top of the agenda. Kennedy would later admit that "
[Khrushchev] beat the hell out of me"
. Khrushchev repeated his threat to sign a a separate peace treaty with the GDR, hand over control of routes into West Berlin to Ulbricht and demand that Western troops leave the city within 6 months. When Kennedy announced that the future security of the USA was tied to West Berlin and that no such withdrawal was feasible, Khrushchev responded by shouting
"I want peace, but if you want war, that's your problem!"
and warning his American counterpart of the consequences of all-out war. Kennedy's response was to say
"If that's true, its going to be a cold winter."
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In a live television address to the American people in July 1961, Kennedy outlined the US position on West Berlin. He continued to emphasise American commitment to West Berlin, stating unequivocally that the USA would be prepared to have war with the USSR over their presence there, as laid out in the terms of the Four Powers Agreement. Kennedy even went as far as to claim that a US surrender in West Berlin was as unacceptable to the American people as a defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad would have been to the Soviet government during World War II. While he publicly reaffirmed the same resolute stance over the city that he had communicated to Khrushchev privately in Vienna, he appeared to hint at a 'way out' from this crisis for the Soviets that would resolve the situation without causing loss of face. The clip to the right is a video of this address (go to 2:58 and finish at 7:11), which was also viewed in Moscow.
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The a high ranking official in the Soviet Foreign Ministry at the time, Anatoly Dobrynin, has since commented that "
[Kennedy] made very clear that he [was] going to defend the status of West Berlin and the status of the routes there but...we noticed...that...he mentioned that the line between West and East Berlin [was] a line of freedom and he didn't say anything about the freedom of movement across this line.
" Kennedy's National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, also later confirmed that
"it is a fact that we were not going to fight about what the Soviets did on their side of Berlin and it is quite likely that Khrushchev was helped to understand that American position by the July Speech [of 1961]".
The Construction of the Wall
At midnight on the 13th of August 1961, the border between East and West Berlin was ordered shut and construction of the Berlin Wall began. This was part of a plan that had been hatched by Khrushchev and Ulbricht once the Soviet leader realised that Kennedy's commitment to West Berlin was no bluff and that the Americans would be prepared to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend it. The line of the wall very carefully followed the border line between East and West Berlin and construction was carried out by East German soldiers- the Red Army remained on alert outside the city. The response to the construction of the wall from Western leaders was surprisingly quiet- in fact many of them were privately relieved that that the wall appeared to stabilize the Berlin situation peacefully. However, Kennedy realised that a gesture of solidarity with the people of West Berlin was required, especially after public protest from West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt. Therefore, he ordered Vice-President Lyndon Johnson, General Lucius Clay (commander of the 1948/9 Berlin Airlift) and a combat unit of 1,500 US troops to travel to West Berlin.
However, the crisis threatened to escalate out of control over Western access to East Berlin, an important issue for the West and guaranteed under the Four Powers Agreement. The GDR shut down all but seven crossing points. West Berliners could use all seven points but required special documents to cross over, whereas all over Westerners could only use one point- the so-called "Checkpoint Charlie", located at the Brandenburg Gate. When a senior American diplomat and his wife were denied access to East Berlin because they refused to show their passports, Clay sent a squad of American soldiers to uphold Western right of access. The Soviets responded by sending in 33 tanks who became engaged in a stand-off with their US counterparts stationed only 100 yards away.
However, the crisis threatened to escalate out of control over Western access to East Berlin, an important issue for the West and guaranteed under the Four Powers Agreement. The GDR shut down all but seven crossing points. West Berliners could use all seven points but required special documents to cross over, whereas all over Westerners could only use one point- the so-called "Checkpoint Charlie", located at the Brandenburg Gate. When a senior American diplomat and his wife were denied access to East Berlin because they refused to show their passports, Clay sent a squad of American soldiers to uphold Western right of access. The Soviets responded by sending in 33 tanks who became engaged in a stand-off with their US counterparts stationed only 100 yards away.
It was at this point that both Kennedy and Khrushchev realised that they needed to regain control. Kennedy rang Clay in order to ensure absolute discipline from his forces while assuring him of his support (Clay was renowned for being an aggressive and belligerent character who believed he had been sent to Berlin to confront the Soviets). Kennedy and Khrushchev by this time were directly communicating through a confidential back channel set up by Robert Kennedy. Khrushchev warned Kennedy that any act of aggression by US forces would be met in kind by Soviet forces. Kennedy then asked Khrushchev to withdraw, assuring him that US forces would do the same. Gradually, inch by inch, both sets of troops backed down and war was averted.
The consequences of the Wall
For the Soviet Union, the construction of the Berlin Wall was an implicit admission of the failure of the Communist system, although it did helped to stabilize the GDR (by 1961, 20% of the population, or 3.5 million people, had defected to the FRG and only 61% of its population was of working age, with emigration to the West disproportionately affecting educated professionals and highly skilled workers). In this respect, it was a propaganda defeat for the USSR. For the USA and other Western countries, there was a sense of relief that the Berlin crisis had been resolved without all-out war between the two superpowers and, over time, the wall became a symbol of Communist weakness and oppression, and therefore a source of propaganda for the West. West Berlin remained an outstanding advert for democratic capitalism and East Germans continued to be able to watch and listen to West German television and radio. Western countries were forced to finally recognize the GDR and the construction of the wall was later seen as the unofficial foundation of the country- Ulbricht would use this event as a catalyst to continue his economic reforms. The biggest victims were the residents of Berlin, some of whom were now either stranded or marooned in the East. Over the next 28 years, 239 people were shot dead trying to cross over the Berlin Wall.
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